Domestic Gold Purchase Programmes’s US$1.7bn loss and matters arising – Bright Kodua writes

Did GoldBod contribute to the US$1.7 billion loss incurred by BoG under the DGPP in 2025? Yes!
Can we attribute all these losses to GoldBod? No!

I have monitored the commentaries surrounding this portion of the IMF report. I think the insults, the defence of the various positions, and the political games have shrouded the relevance of the matter. Let me try to separate the issues, and I hope you will follow keenly.

A — FACTS

The Domestic Gold Purchase Programme (DGPP), as we are told, was Dr. Bawumia’s solution, initiated in 2021, to address the long-standing depreciation of the cedi.
The objective was simple: the Bank of Ghana (BoG) should purchase Ghanaian gold and sell it to generate more US dollars (FX). This was intended to reduce the country’s dependence on borrowing at high costs to obtain dollars to stabilise the cedi and the economy—a strategy that had proven over the years to be largely a temporary fix.
Within the DGPP framework was another programme called Gold for Oil (G4O), with a related sub-objective: to sell some of the accumulated gold reserves in exchange for petroleum products instead of sourcing FX from the open market to import those products.
By the end of 2024, BoG and IMF reports indicated that these initiatives had both positive and negative sides.

Positive:

Greater stability of the cedi
Greater stability in fuel pricing
Increased FX reserves for BoG, reaching about US$3.6 billion
A 31% reduction in cedi depreciation
Approximately 37 tonnes of gold reserves at BoG

Negative:

High operational costs, particularly for G4O, estimated at about US$400 million
Excessive dollars in the system, creating high FX liquidity and potential inflationary pressure

It is important to note that, up until 2025, when GoldBod was established, these transactions were being undertaken with BoG as the owner of the programme, while PMMC and the Minerals Commission served as implementing agencies of sorts.
In 2025, GoldBod was established. The Ministry of Finance explicitly described the old system as fragmented, involving PMMC, BoG, MIIF and private aggregators. Under GoldBod, the government sought to end this fragmentation.
GoldBod subsequently moved from being an agent of BoG to having full operational control of gold trading, including buying, aggregation, assaying and export within the small-scale gold sector. It was then expected to support BoG with the proceeds to achieve the same broader objectives: cedi stabilisation, strengthening FX reserves, and so on.
We are told that since its establishment, GoldBod has carried out its mandate specific to this BoG programme and has exported about 100 tonnes of gold, resulting in approximately US$10 billion mobilised through its operations to support BoG in 2025 alone.

Now, with points 1–8 as the background, let us move to the 2025 IMF report, particularly the popular paragraph 13 referenced in the discussion.

In the paragraph under discussion, the IMF reported that the DGPP for BoG, currently implemented by GoldBod, has, alongside its positive outcomes, incurred losses of about US$1.7 billion, equivalent to roughly 1.5% of GDP, and approximately 150% of the losses recorded in 2024.
The IMF referred to these losses as operational and valuation costs recorded in the books of BoG and provided a breakdown that included:

GoldBod fees — assay/service costs, discounts when selling gold, and other transaction costs.
Valuation costs — gold was purchased at the forex bureau price but sold or accounted for at the BoG rate.

In fact, the IMF is saying that, in its view, some of these losses should be moved to GoldBod’s books rather than remaining entirely in BoG’s books, particularly because they contributed to equity falling below -6% on BoG’s balance sheet.
The challenge here is that the design of the DGPP was not wholly GoldBod’s creation. It was a BoG programme, with BoG as its owner. However, allowing BoG to solely carry all the losses is also not necessarily fair. A proper attributional analysis ought to be undertaken to determine and agree on what costs each entity should bear.
Another unanswered question is whether the loss is excessive or within an acceptable range. The IMF’s position appears to be that the losses are too high and that there is a need to discuss how they can be reduced.
Another area that we are not discussing enough is that, as of December 2025, BoG’s gold reserves had declined sharply from approximately 37 tonnes to 18 tonnes. This is a matter that should concern us and deserves a proper explanation.

CONCLUSION

The narrative that GoldBod should be solely responsible for the US$1.7 billion loss cannot, in my view, be entirely fair. It is like blaming a driver solely for a crashed car when the driver was handed a vehicle by the owner with defective brakes.
However, the narrative that the loss should be entirely attributed to BoG, leaving GoldBod completely clean, is equally inaccurate. GoldBod, as an implementing agency, and having benefited from the 2024 gains of the programme, could reasonably have identified defects in the programme’s design and proposed changes. More importantly, the IMF’s breakdown specifically mentions GoldBod fees as one contributor to the loss. Therefore, those shouting that the IMF never mentioned GoldBod are simply blowing hot air and are not speaking to the facts.

The issue, therefore, should not be reduced to political insults or partisan defence. The real question is how much of the US$1.7 billion loss can properly be attributed to GoldBod, how much to BoG, and how much to the underlying design and operation of the DGPP?

The Biblical metaphorical question is:

Shall we accept the good from DGPP when implemented by GoldBod and reject or deflect the negative aspects of the same programme?

If we celebrate the gains, we must also be prepared to confront the losses and weaknesses honestly. Anything else risks becoming stiff-necked and hypocritical, much like the lesson conveyed in Job 2:10.

Thank you.