STATEMENT: 10 Questions Gov’t Must Answer on Proposed NITA Bill – Libertarian Think Tanks Demand

The proposed National Information Technology Agency (NITA) Bill, 2025, is one of Ghana’s most ambitious initiatives to reform its digital economy after 18 years of fragmented legislation. The Bill imposes criminal penalties, licensing requirements, revenue levies, strong ministerial powers, and broad regulatory control over software developers, startups, ICT experts, and digital businesses.

On 26 May 2026, the Ministry of Communication, Digital Technology and Innovations convened a stakeholder consultation under the theme “The NITA Bill and Ghana’s Digital Future: Responding to Stakeholder Concerns”. While we appreciate the participation, several clarifications provided during the session raise as many new questions as were answered. Notably, the Minister indicated that the version of the NITA Bill in the public domain is already out of date, with an updated version 4.0 or 5.0 currently before Cabinet for consideration, but no new text was made accessible to stakeholders. Consultations with stakeholders on a superseded document are not real engagement; they are procedural theatre.

We acknowledge three clarifications from the stakeholders’ consultation:
a) The 1% gross revenue levy has been removed from the current version.
b) The licensing framework is now described as targeting businesses providing ICT services to government entities, Ministries, MMDAs, and State Authorities — not the general IT industry.
c) Inspection powers will require legal process, including warrants.

These compromises are noted. They do not, however, address the fundamental difficulties raised below. As an association whose members are dedicated to economic freedom, innovation, civil liberty, free markets, and ease of doing business, the Ghana Association of Libertarian Think Tanks urges the government to offer clear, direct, and public responses to the questions below before the Bill is laid before Parliament.

𝟏. 𝐈𝐟 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐒𝐜𝐨𝐩𝐞 𝐈𝐬 𝐆𝐨𝐯𝐞𝐫𝐧𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭 𝐂𝐨𝐧𝐭𝐫𝐚𝐜𝐭𝐬, 𝐖𝐡𝐲 𝐃𝐨𝐞𝐬 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐁𝐢𝐥𝐥’𝐬 𝐓𝐞𝐱𝐭 𝐍𝐨𝐭 𝐒𝐚𝐲 𝐒𝐨?
The Minister indicated during the consultation that the licensing regime focuses on ICT companies that provide services to government agencies, rather than the whole digital sector. However, the language of the Bill in public circulation does not contain such a restriction. The categories listed as requiring licensure are incredibly broad:
• Business and Productivity Software and Licensing Services
• Mobile Application Developers
• E-commerce Service Providers
• Data Brokers and Data Analytics Service Providers
• Fintech Entities and Financial Information Providers
• Market Data Providers
• Miscellaneous ICT Components and Goods

These categories encompass virtually every digital business in Ghana — regardless of whether they have any relationship with the government. If the scope is genuinely limited to government contractors, the Bill must say so explicitly. A minister’s verbal assurance at a stakeholder session is not law.

These categories encompass almost every digital business operating in Ghana, regardless of whether they have a relationship with the government. If the scope is indeed confined to providing IT services and equipment to MDAs/MMDAs in the fulfillment of government functions, the Bill should state so explicitly. A verbal assurance from the Minister during a stakeholder session is not law.

• Will the government release the current Cabinet version of the Bill immediately so stakeholders can verify whether the scope restriction is actually enacted in legislative text?
• If the current text does not restrict the regime to government contractors, why are stakeholders being consulted on a misrepresented scope?

A law means what it says. Ministerial interpretation cannot substitute for precise statutory language.

𝟐. 𝐖𝐡𝐲 𝐖𝐞𝐫𝐞 𝐒𝐭𝐚𝐤𝐞𝐡𝐨𝐥𝐝𝐞𝐫𝐬 𝐂𝐨𝐧𝐬𝐮𝐥𝐭𝐞𝐝 𝐨𝐧 𝐚𝐧 𝐎𝐮𝐭𝐝𝐚𝐭𝐞𝐝 𝐃𝐨𝐜𝐮𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭?
At the consultation on May 26, the Minister affirmed that the version now in circulation is not the one that Cabinet is currently considering. A Version 4.0 or 5.0 of the NITA Bill exists. He explained that the updated version 4.0 or 5.0 of the NITA Bill could not be shared due to his commitment to the oath of Cabinet secrecy.

This justification is inadequate. The text of a proposed bill is not covered by Cabinet confidentiality; only Cabinet memoranda are. The Cabinet memo is not required by the public. What is required is the most recent version of the Bill that may impact the livelihoods and rights of the public. The government can engage the public on a draft that it knows is outdated and then proceed with a significantly different document, which sets a troubling precedent.

a) Will the government immediately publish the current text of the NITA Bill as it stands before Cabinet, separated from any Cabinet memo?
b) Will the government commit to a fresh, substantive consultation round based on the actual current text before the Bill is laid before Parliament?

Stakeholder consultation conducted on a superseded draft is, at minimum, a waste of public time. At worst, it is deliberate misdirection. Parliament itself deserves to consider a document that reflects the actual regulatory intent.

At the very least, stakeholder consultation on an outdated draft is a waste of public time. It is, at worst, intentional deception. Parliament itself deserves to consider a document that reflects the actual regulatory intent.

𝟑. 𝐎𝐧 𝐖𝐡𝐚𝐭 𝐋𝐞𝐠𝐚𝐥 𝐁𝐚𝐬𝐢𝐬 𝐈𝐬 𝐀𝐧𝐲 𝐏𝐚𝐫𝐭 𝐨𝐟 𝐓𝐡𝐢𝐬 𝐑𝐞𝐠𝐢𝐦𝐞 𝐂𝐮𝐫𝐫𝐞𝐧𝐭𝐥𝐲 𝐎𝐩𝐞𝐫𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧𝐚𝐥?
There are legitimate concerns that before Parliament passed the Bill, parts of the licence and fee ecosystem were already being operationalised. The Fees and Charges Act (Act 1080), L.I. 2481, and L.I. 2512 have been mentioned by the Minister in defence as the current legal basis.

This is not a valid argument. Prices for services that are already legally permitted are set by fee schedules. They do not independently establish significant regulatory authority, force private companies to apply for licences, or penalise non-compliance. The Electronic Transactions Act, 2008 (Act 772), Section 38(1) is explicit: “A licence shall not be issued or granted by the Agency to an individual.”

a) Which specific statutory provision — not a fees instrument — currently authorises NITA to compel licensing of private ICT businesses?
b) Has the Ministry obtained independent legal advice confirming the legality of any operational elements of this regime prior to parliamentary enactment?
c) If the Bill is needed to create this authority, will the government acknowledge that this is a new regulatory regime, not a codification of existing arrangements?

Regulatory power is not the same as pricing power. An invoice does not constitute authorisation. Democratic legitimacy cannot be replaced by administrative ambition.

𝟒. 𝐃𝐨𝐞𝐬 𝐂𝐫𝐢𝐦𝐢𝐧𝐚𝐥𝐢𝐬𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐔𝐧𝐥𝐢𝐜𝐞𝐧𝐬𝐞𝐝 𝐎𝐩𝐞𝐫𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐒𝐞𝐫𝐯𝐞 𝐀𝐧𝐲 𝐏𝐫𝐨𝐩𝐨𝐫𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧𝐚𝐭𝐞 𝐏𝐮𝐫𝐩𝐨𝐬𝐞?
The publicly accessible version of the Bill makes it illegal to operate an ICT business without a licence and imposes fines or imprisonment, or both. One crucial question arises if the Minister’s scope guarantee is accurate and exclusively relates to IT services and equipment providers to government:

a) Why does failure of an IT service provider to government registration warrant criminal sanction rather than administrative disqualification from tendering?

Every other procurement regime in Ghana handles non-compliance through civil and administrative measures, including contract rejection, deregistration, and state-imposed financial penalties. No serious procurement framework criminalises businesses for failing to register.

If, on the other hand, the criminal prohibitions expand beyond government contractors to the wider digital economy, the initial issue remains completely valid: freelance developers, student coders, startups, and small software firms face criminal exposure simply for operating without state approval.

b) What specific, documented public harm does this criminalisation address that cannot be remedied by administrative and civil mechanisms?
c) Will the government commit, in the revised Bill, to replacing criminal penalties with proportionate administrative sanctions?

Criminal law should be a last resort, not a first instrument of regulatory compliance.

𝟓. 𝐈𝐬 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝟏% 𝐋𝐞𝐯𝐲 𝐆𝐨𝐧𝐞, 𝐨𝐫 𝐉𝐮𝐬𝐭 𝐑𝐞𝐥𝐨𝐜𝐚𝐭𝐞𝐝?
The Minister confirmed that the 1% gross revenue levy had been eliminated. GALT acknowledges this. However, because the current Cabinet wording is missing, we cannot confirm whether equivalent extraction has been reintroduced by other means, such as increased licence fees, renewal charges, or transaction-based levies.

The pricing schedule presented during the consultation ranges from $55 to $3,055, depending on the service category. While the Minister referred to these as “small compared to what businesses charge the government,” this framing is inaccurate. Fee proportionality should be measured against the cost of compliance and economic viability, not against contract values.

a) Will the government publish the full, current fee schedule in the updated Bill text for public scrutiny?
b) Has a Regulatory Impact Assessment been conducted on the cumulative cost burden — including licence fees, renewal fees, compliance obligations, and administrative time — on ICT SMEs and startups?
c) Will the government commit that no new revenue extraction mechanism has been substituted for the removed 1% levy in Version 4.0/5.0 of the NITA Bill?

The removal of the gross revenue levy is welcome. Its replacement with a different type of extraction would be a purely cosmetic concession rather than a substantive one.

𝟔. 𝐇𝐨𝐰 𝐃𝐨𝐞𝐬 𝐒𝐞𝐜𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝟒𝟔 𝐈𝐧𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐚𝐜𝐭 𝐖𝐢𝐭𝐡 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐎𝐧𝐞 𝐌𝐢𝐥𝐥𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐂𝐨𝐝𝐞𝐫𝐬 𝐏𝐫𝐨𝐠𝐫𝐚𝐦𝐦𝐞?
Section 46 of the Bill, as currently circulated, prohibits employment as an ICT specialist without NITA certification. The Minister did not withdraw or significantly amend this provision during the consultation. The government is also promoting the One Million Coders Programme, which aims to cultivate digital talent on a large scale.

The conflict is systemic, not incidental. A programme meant to train hundreds of thousands of coders cannot coexist with legislation that makes those coders unemployed until they obtain state certification — especially if:
• Certification timelines are long or capacity is limited.
• Certification costs are prohibitive for recent graduates.
• There is no automatic certification pathway for programme graduates.

• How does the government plan to certify One Million Coders graduates at scale?
• What is the certification cost, processing timeline, and pass/fail framework?
• Will programme graduates automatically receive provisional certification upon completion?
• If a graduate cannot immediately afford or obtain certification, are they legally prohibited from accepting employment in their trained field?

The government cannot responsibly invest public funds in a digital skills initiative while also creating a legal barrier between those talents and employment.

𝟕. 𝐖𝐡𝐚𝐭 𝐀𝐧𝐭𝐢-𝐂𝐨𝐫𝐫𝐮𝐩𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐒𝐚𝐟𝐞𝐠𝐮𝐚𝐫𝐝𝐬 𝐄𝐱𝐢𝐬𝐭 𝐖𝐢𝐭𝐡𝐢𝐧 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐏𝐫𝐨𝐩𝐨𝐬𝐞𝐝 𝐋𝐢𝐜𝐞𝐧𝐬𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐑𝐞𝐠𝐢𝐦𝐞?
The proposed NITA Bill establishes a robust regulatory framework that includes licensing authorities, inspection powers, fee administration, enforcement capabilities, and influence on government-facing ICT enterprises. Globally, systems that combine regulatory discretion with market access are among the most vulnerable to corruption and rent-seeking.

The Bill appears to offer considerable power over licence approvals, renewals, inspections, and compliance determinations, but there is little public clarity about safeguards against abuse.

a) What independent appeal mechanisms exist for businesses denied licences or subjected to enforcement actions?
b) Are licensing criteria objective and publicly available?
c) Will licensing decisions and enforcement actions be transparently published?
d) Does the Bill prevent conflicts of interest involving NITA officials and licensed entities?
e) Are whistleblower protections available for businesses reporting extortion or unofficial payments?

Without sufficient anti-corruption safeguards, the regime risks becoming a gatekeeping system that prioritises political access and regulatory influence over innovation, competition, entrepreneurial merit, and productivity.

𝟖. 𝐖𝐡𝐨 𝐀𝐜𝐭𝐮𝐚𝐥𝐥𝐲 𝐆𝐨𝐯𝐞𝐫𝐧𝐬 𝐆𝐡𝐚𝐧𝐚’𝐬 𝐃𝐢𝐠𝐢𝐭𝐚𝐥 𝐄𝐜𝐨𝐧𝐨𝐦𝐲?
The proposed NITA Bill creates significant jurisdictional overlap with existing regulatory bodies:
• The Cyber Security Authority — cybersecurity standards and incident response
• The Data Protection Commission — data governance and privacy
• The National Communications Authority — telecommunications and spectrum
• The Bank of Ghana — fintech and payment systems
• Emerging AI and cloud governance structures under development

It is conceivable that a fintech business that employs AI-driven analytics, manages health data, and offers cloud-based services to a government ministry may need licences, registrations, or compliance certificates from five or more regulatory agencies. Each has its own costs, renewal schedules, authority to conduct inspections, and procedures for enforcement.

a) Which institution has ultimate authority over AI systems, cloud infrastructure, and data governance — and what is the legal basis for that determination?
b) How many separate compliance obligations will a typical technology startup face under the combined framework?
c) Has the government conducted a regulatory mapping exercise to identify and resolve overlapping jurisdictions before adding another layer?

Regulatory clarity is not a luxury. It is a precondition for investment, innovation, and economic growth.

𝟗. 𝐖𝐡𝐲 𝐃𝐨𝐞𝐬 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐁𝐢𝐥𝐥 𝐆𝐫𝐚𝐧𝐭 𝐎𝐩𝐞𝐧-𝐄𝐧𝐝𝐞𝐝 𝐌𝐢𝐧𝐢𝐬𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐢𝐚𝐥 𝐄𝐱𝐩𝐚𝐧𝐬𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐏𝐨𝐰𝐞𝐫𝐬?
The Bill reportedly allows the Minister to define, expand, or modify the categories of activities requiring licences through Legislative Instrument. This provision is structurally incompatible with the Minister’s own scoping assurance.

If the licensing regime is genuinely limited to government contractors — as stated at the stakeholder consultation — there is no need for open-ended ministerial power to expand it. It is stated in section 37(6) that “a licence is valid for the period and on the terms and conditions that may be determined by the agency.” This provision places businesses at the mercy of the Minister’s discretion.

• Why does a Bill described as targeting government contractors require ministerial power to expand the licensing regime without parliamentary oversight?
• Will government remove Section 37(6) or replace it with a provision that clearly defines the validity of licences?
• What sunset, review, or parliamentary override mechanisms exist to constrain the use of this power under the NITA Bill?

Regulatory certainty matters for investment decisions. An open-ended ministerial expansion clause makes the entire framework unpredictable — by design or by structure.

𝟏𝟎. 𝐒𝐡𝐨𝐮𝐥𝐝 𝐍𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧𝐚𝐥 𝐒𝐞𝐜𝐮𝐫𝐢𝐭𝐲 𝐂𝐲𝐛𝐞𝐫 𝐓𝐡𝐫𝐞𝐚𝐭𝐬 𝐁𝐞 𝐇𝐚𝐧𝐝𝐥𝐞𝐝 𝐛𝐲 𝐚 𝐂𝐨𝐦𝐦𝐞𝐫𝐜𝐢𝐚𝐥 𝐑𝐞𝐠𝐮𝐥𝐚𝐭𝐨𝐫?
During the consultation, the Minister stated that one justification for NITA’s extended authority is to protect important government systems from cyber threats. This is a legitimate concern. However, it creates a structural question that has not been addressed.

If the true concern is national security — protecting critical databases, government networks, and state systems from foreign or domestic threats — the appropriate response is a dedicated state cyber defence capability: a military or intelligence-grade cyber unit with the technical capacity, legal authority, and operational mandate to address those threats.

Creating a commercial licence and fee-collection regime at NITA and labelling it a security framework does not address the security issue. It imposes a compliance burden on legitimate local enterprises while doing nothing to deter sophisticated external threats who do not register with NITA or pay its fees.

Does the government have a dedicated military or intelligence cyber unit with operational capability to protect critical national infrastructure?
• If yes, what is the relationship between that unit and NITA’s proposed inspection and enforcement powers?
• If not, why is the government building a commercial licensing regime instead of an actual security capability?
• What evidence exists that mandatory business licensing prevents the security breaches the government claims to be concerned about?

Security threats necessitate security responses. A licensing authority is not a cyber-defence force. Ghana deserves both, but must not mistake one for the other.

𝐂𝐨𝐧𝐜𝐥𝐮𝐬𝐢𝐨𝐧
Ghana’s technological ecosystem expanded as innovators were free to build, experiment, compete, and create. The Internet economy was not founded on criminal penalties, licensing monopolies, or bureaucratic gatekeeping.

The stakeholder consultation on May 26, 2026, was an admirable gesture. However, consulting the public on an obsolete version of a Bill that is already before Cabinet does not constitute real involvement. It is a post-facto rationalisation. The opportunity for significant public input is fast shrinking.

Three things are required before Parliament proceeds:
• Full publication of the current version of the Bill (4.0/5.0).
• Conduct a second round of stakeholder consultation based on the actual content, including proper notice and written feedback.
• Provide written, public answers to all ten questions, not verbal guarantees in a single session.

Ghana’s digital future must be founded on innovation, competition, constitutional governance, and economic freedom, rather than excessive regulation, administrative opacity, and centralised control.

𝐒𝐢𝐠𝐧𝐞𝐝
𝐆𝐡𝐚𝐧𝐚 𝐀𝐬𝐬𝐨𝐜𝐢𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐨𝐟 𝐋𝐢𝐛𝐞𝐫𝐭𝐚𝐫𝐢𝐚𝐧 𝐓𝐡𝐢𝐧𝐤 𝐓𝐚𝐧𝐤𝐬
Members
YAFO Institute
Institute for New Policy Thinking
Institute for Liberty and Economic Education – ILEE
Students for Liberty – Ghana
Ladies Network for Economic Freedom – LANEF
The Tax Institute
Alumni for Liberty – Ghana